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If the facts in this case are to be considered as falling within article VI, section
41/2, it would be an insurmountable task for the plaintiff to comply with the majority
opinion's requirement that prejudice resulting from the error be shown. This preju-
dicial error could only be brought to the attention of the court by an affirmative
showing that a juror was biased or otherwise unfit, or that the juror in question
contributed to the adverse verdict.
As the dissent points out:
"It is well settled that affidavits or evidence of any character concerning the mental
attitude of either concurring or dissenting jurors which tend to contradict, impeach, or
defeat their verdict are inadmissible. Even affidavits or testimony of third persons offered
to prove admissions of jurors to impeach the verdict are not countenanced. In fact, the
authorities are uniform . . .affidavits or oral evidence of jurors may not be received to
contradict, impeach or defeat their verdict, except to show that the verdict was secured
by chance."'14
As illustrated above, except when a verdict is rendered by chance, to show error
through an attack on the means by which the verdict was attained is in direct conflict
with a fundamental concept of the law. 15 The majority of this court does not disclose
by what method the required prejudice might be shown. It is obvious that it should
not be the intention of the Constitution or the judiciary to maintain that the only
accessible means for showing such prejudice should be violative of a well settled and
practical doctrine. Such an anomaly cannot be sustained; yet such a result is
inevitable unless another means is open.
It is submitted that when there are two actual or apparent colliding intents in
the law, the courts should adopt that interpretation which allows them both to have
their intended effect. This can be achieved in this case by construing article VI,
section 4 , as the Legislature seemingly intended, "to cure reversals for technical
errors and omissions, and not to abridge the accepted safeguards essential to a fair
trial."
By this strict construction the right to peremptory challenge would retain its
statutory power of providing litigants a means of securing an impartial jury, without
resorting to methods which, by their nature, would question the jury verdict. Such
construction would afford the litigant his right to peremptorily challenge without
the dangerous alternative of upsetting jury verdicts. Only by such interpretation
will the present untenable position be rectified.
-ohn M. Shelton.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS: DAMAGES FOR DisHONoR.-Prior to state legis-
lation on the subject, California and a decided majority of American courts' allowed
a businessman to recover substantial damages from a bank that had wrongfully
dishonored his check. The businessman was not required to allege and prove actual
damage to his credit or reputation as a result of the dishonor. A presumption that
substantial damages had been sustained arose when the businessman proved that the
bank had dishonored his check when he had sufficient funds on deposit to honor it.2
1445 Cal.2d - , 288 P.2d 26 (1955).
Toomes v. Nunes, 24 Cal.App.2d 395, 75 P.2d 94 (1938) ; Phipps v. Patterson, 27 Cal.App.2d
545, 81 P.2d 437 (1938) ; Gray v. Robinson, 33 Cal.App.2d 177, 91 P.2d 194 (1939) ; Johnson v.
Gray, 4 Cal.App.2d 72, 40 P.2d 575 (1935).
'Reeves v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal.App. 508, 129 Pac. 800 (1912). Additional cases are
collected in 4 A.L.R. 948 (1919).
2 The terminology normally used is that the presumption applies to a trader, but the term
trader means a businessman. Peabody v. Citizens State Bank, 98 Minn. 312, 108 N.W. 272 (1906).
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The statutory damages to be awarded for dishonor of a depositor's check by a
bank under California Civil Code section 3320 was a question of first impression
before the court in the recent case of Abramowitz v. Bank of America.3 The plaintiff
depositor was purchasing an automobile by installments as provided in a conditional
sales contract. The depositor gave a check to the vendor in payment of a monthly
installment pursuant to the said contract. The defendant bank, evidently as a result
of mistake or error, dishonored the check. Since the depositor was otherwise unable
to pay, the vendor repossessed and sold the automobile as provided in the conditional
sales contract. The court held the damages collectible by the depositor to be the
market value of the automobile, relying upon California Civil Code section 3320 as
prescribing the liability of the bank. Section 3320, enacted in 1917, provides:
"No bank shall be liable to a depositor because of the non-payment through mistake
or error and without malice of a check which should have been paid unless the depositor
shall allege and prove actual damages by reason of such non-payment and in such event
the liability shall not exceed the amount of damage so proven."
The court stated that the effect of section 3320 was to abolish the common law
presumption of damage to a businessman, citing a previous case for support.4 The
court in the principal case, and the case cited for support, failed to classify the
plaintiffs in the actions as businessmen. Since the presumption has never been applied
to a non-businessman the decisions may be considered dicta. Regardless of this,
however, it may be assumed that the presumption has been abolished in California.
This interpretation of the statute is in accord with the decisions in other juris-
dictions under a similar statute.5
The statute may be interpreted so that the depositor is given an action in contract
or tort at his election. The court in the principal case allowed the option by interpreting
"actual damages" as used in section 3320 to be that provided for in California Civil
Code section 3333. Section 3333 allows damages for the proximately caused detriment
incurred by the plaintiff whether contemplated by the parties at the time of the
contract agreement or not;6 whereas in contract, the damages are restricted to those
contemplated. 7 This interpretation is amply supported by a very well reasoned
analysis of all the damage sections in the California Civil Code in Siminoff v. Jas. H.
Goodman & Co. Bank.8 The unfairness and danger of limiting the action to contract
is shown in Meyer v. Hudson Trust Co.,9 where the dishonoring bank was held not
to have contemplated that dishonor of a check would cause abandonment of a contract
between the payee of the check and the depositor. The abandonment resulted because,
after the dishonor, the payee would only accept cash which the depositor was unable
to furnish. Even with the tort action available, California' 0 and some states" hold
8131 CalApp.2d 892, 281 P.2d 380 (1955).
'Allen v. Bank of America, 58 Cal.App.2d 124, 136 P.2d 345 (1943).
"Woody v. First Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Ducros,
27 Ala.App. 193, 168 So. 704 (1936) ; Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie, 220 Mo.App. 165, 281 S.W. 130
(1926).
6 CALiF. Civ. COnE- § 3333 provides: "For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
the measure of damages, except where otherwise provided by this code, is the amount which will
compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated
or not."
'Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co., 150 Cal. 51, 87 Pac. 1093 (1906).
818 Cal.App. 5, 121 Pac. 939 (1912).
8 181 App.Div. 69, 168 N.Y.S. 387 (1917).
20 Hartford v. All Night & Day Bank, 170 Cal. 538,150 Pac. 356 (1915).
'Wheeler v. Bank of Edenton, 209 N.C. 258, 183 S.E. 269 (1936) ; Western Nat'l Bank v.
White, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 131 S.W. 828 (1910); Bank of Commerce v. Goos, 39 Neb. 437,
58 N.W. 84 (1894).
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that the arrest or criminal prosecution of the depositor for passing a "bad" check is
not proximately caused by the banks' act of dishonoring the same "bad" check.
The dictum in the principal case is a fair and reasonable interpretation of section
3320, but the practical effect of it is to diminish the liability of banks to their business-
man depositors and disrupt a well established and emphatically stated common law
rule.
Prior to legislation upon the question, the courts of California and other states' 2
often repeated and found wise guidance in the presumption of injury to a businessman.
The presumption is based upon the fact that it is almost impossible for a check to be
dishonored without reflecting on the character and credit of the drawer, 13 and the
accompanying delay also always inflicts damage to credit.' 4 This impeachment of
credit must be an actual injury to the depositor, but from the nature of the case
he cannot furnish independent and distinct proof thereof, any more than it is possible
for one charged with the commission of a crime to show especially in what manner
he has been injured. 5 The general experience of men in such transactions' 6 is that
substantial damages are the natural and probable consequence of the act of dishonor, 1"
so a presumption arises.
Today, the banks' responsibility and effect on our business life is ever increasing
due to the increased usage of its facilities. Because of the decentralization of community
life we seldom acquire personal knowledge of our fellow citizens' reputation, but in the
business world the facilities for determining the credit of others has been increased
and such credit information is easily obtained. Thus the slightest smear on a credit
reputation is rapidly broadcast and impersonally received. The result is a tendency
to refuse credit on the slightest provocation. What then is the justification for the
passage of a statute that limits a bank's liability to actual proof of damages by the
depositor when such proof was not considered practically possible before?
The statute as enacted by the California Legislature was in substance the same
statute approved and recommended by the American Bankers Association to the
various State Bankers Associations as desirable for enactment in their respective
states.' s The reasons posed by the Association of Bankers, evidently to the various state
legislatures, to affect enactment of their formulated statute should provide an answer
to the question of legislative justification in enacting the statute.' 9
The first reason advanced by the Association for abolishing the common law
presumption is:
"... But the fact is often contrary to the presumption and probably in the majority
of instances where a customer's check is refused payment through error, the mistake is
promptly corrected, an explanatory letter is written by the banker and no actual damage
results to the customer." 20
The fact, if contrary to the presumption, should be apparent in the assessment of
damages under the instructions given by most courts that the damages assessed must
12 Siminoff v. Jas. H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal.App. 5, 121 Pac. 939 (1912) ; Atlanta Nat'l
Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E. 190 (1895) ; Johnson v. National Bank, 213 S.C. 458, 50 S.E.2d
177 (1948).13Ibid.
,Janin v. London & San Francisco Bank, 92 Cal. 14, 27 Pac. 1100 (1891).
15 Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 fI1. 109, 28 N.E. 917 (1891).
'6 Lorick v. Palmetto Bank & Trust Co., 74 S.C. 185, 54 S.E. 206 (1906).1' Third Nat'l Bank v. Ober, 178 Fed. 678 (8th Cir. 1910).
1 PATON, DIGEST 1117 (1940).
'Ibid.
"Ibid.
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be reasonable as per individual case, in reference to the injury suffered by the depositor
to his reputation and credit standing; 21 or temperate damages, which are defined as
that such as would be reasonable compensation for the injury; 22 or damages reason-
ably and fairly in the natural course of things.23 In Hilton v. Jessup Banking Co.,2 4
the practical effect of such an instruction is shown by the jury's assessment of ten
dollars damages. The attempt of the dishonoring bank to rectify the damage is praise-
worthy morally but is not an answer to an action at law for the wrong done, and the
presumption operates regardless of it, as in other tortious acts.25 The courts provide
an adequate recognition of the banks' effort to rectify their error by admitting such acts
in evidence to mitigate damages. 26 The effect of such an admission is shown in Wood
v. American National Bank2 7 where the court approved the trial court's setting aside
of the jury assessed damages of $750 and entering a $50 judgment.
The second reason the bankers give to support their position is:
"The application of the rule, therefore, works an injustice to the bank which is often
mulcted in damages out of all proportion to the imaginary injury inflicted."'2 8
An investigation of the cases in which the excessiveness of the damage is in
issue provides an analysis of this reason. The cases noted are limited to those in which
the highest damages were awarded to the depositer. In Wiley v. Bunker Hill National
Bank2 9 actual damage to the depositor's business was not shown, but his business
amounted to $150,000 yearly, and the court, because of this, approved the trial
judge's reduction of jury assessed damages of $25,000 to $10,000. The court in
Johnson v. National Bank30 thought the trial judge had not abused his discretionary
power in permitting a verdict of $1,250 to stand because of direct evidence given of
damage to the depositor's credit. Damages of $1,000 was given in Commercial
National Bank v. Latham3l when the only damage shown was plaintiff's testimony
that she was so mortified she did not know what to do, but this was done without
the aid of a presumption. The instruction given by the court in Berea Bank & Trust Co.
v. Mokwa3 2 allowed the plaintiff such sum as would reasonably compensate him
for any loss of time or loss or impairment of credit. The jury awarded $750 damages.
Since the cases above are the upper limit of the damages awarded, let us balance
the scales with decisions of low damage awards where the excessiveness of the damages
was not in issue. The jury in Weaver v. Grenada Banks3 with the use of the presumption
assessed damages at nothing. The trial court declined to accept this award and a
further verdict of five dollars was reversed by the appellate court as nominal and
not substantial. Dishonor of checks totaling $703.75 drawn by the head of a military
academy in Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank3 4 resulted in use of the presump-
tion and $300 damages. The reviewing court in State Bank v. Marshall5 reversed the
21McFall v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Ark. 370, 211 S.W. 919 (1919).
"Hilton v. Jessup Banking Co., 128 Ga. 30, 57 S.E. 78 (1907).
'Berea Bank & Trust Co. v. Mokwa, 194 Ky. 556, 239 S.W. 1044 (1922).
"See note 22 supra.
'Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548 (1911).
:- Ibid.
'7100 Va. 306, 40 S.E. 931 (1902).
"See note 18 supra.
"183 Mass. 495, 67 N.E. 655 (1903).
:o See note 12 supra.
' 29 Okla. 88, 116 Pac. 197 (1911).
"'See note 23 supra.
" 180 Miss. 876,179 So. 564 (1938).
: See note 25 supra.
" 163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924).
May, 19561 NOTES
